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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In September of 1980, the plaintiffs, Hansens, acquired 
the real property in Emery County, Utah which is the subject of 
this action, the Green River Motel. Plaintiff Hansens, by their 
own admission, never inspected the property. (Tr. 74) . In the 
same month, plaintiffs sold the motel to Synvest Corporation, a 
Nevada corporation, by a Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 
2). The sale price set forth on the contract was Five Hundred 
Sixty-five Thousand ($565,000.00) Dollars. The contract was 
signed by all the plaintiffs as sellers and on behalf of Synvest 
Corporation as buyer by Boyd Hansen, Vice President. 
The property was sold by Synvest Corporation to The 
Green River Group by an undated Uniform Real Estate Contract, for 
the amount of Six Hundred Forty-five Thousand ($645,000.00) 
Dollars. (Exhibit 3). The delivery date for the property, 
September 1, 1980, payments and other conditions of the contract 
were substantially identical with those of the contract between 
plaintiffs and defendant Synvest. Boyd Hansen, as Vice President 
signed the Synvest—Green River Group contract on behalf of 
Synvest as seller, and Ramon Pratt signed on behalf of Green 
River Group as a partner, as buyer. The plaintiff Hansens did 
not learn of the sale by Synvest to Green River Group until four 
months after it took place. (Tr. 44-45). 
Green River Group took over the operation of the motel 
in approximately September of 1980. (Tr. 126). The motel at 
that time was in a state of disrepair; the roof leaked, the sewer 
system did not operate properly, the motel sign was blown down, 
and the premises were dirty and trashy. (Tr. 136-141) . The 
motel structure itself was approximately 25 years old. (Tr. 
143) . The Green River Group spent in excess of Fifty-six 
Thousand ($56,000.00) Dollars in repairs and upkeep on the motel. 
(Tr. 130). 
The payments under the contracts were made only 
sporadically, with the last payment being made in December of 
1983. Plaintiff Brent Hansen testified that the payments were 
made by defendant Synvest. (Tr. 79). Green River Group 
quitclaimed the property back to Synvest Corporation on February 
29, 1984. (Exhibit 15). Green River Group and Synvest also 
executed an agreement on that date rescinding the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract previously entered into by the parties with 
respect to the Green River Motel. (Exhibit 16). The agreement 
was signed on behalf of Synvest by Gilbert Allard as Vice 
President, and on behalf of Green River Group by Nolan Wathen, 
Brent Pratt and Ramon Pratt as partners. This action by the 
plaintiffs followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The contract between defendant Synvest and defendant 
Green River Group was not an assumption by Green River Group of 
Synvestfs contract with the Hansens and was not sufficient to 
bind Green River Group or its individual partners to the personal 
obligation of the defendant Synvest, for purposes of a deficiency 
judgment. Since the contract between Synvest and Green River 
Group benefited the plaintiff Hansens only incidentally, they 
cannot recover under a third party beneficiary theory. There was 
insufficient evidence introduced at trial to indicate an alter 
ego relationship between Synvest and Green River Group. There 
was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to find Green River 
Group liable for waste. Because of these deficiencies, neither 
Green River Group nor any of the partners thereof are liable on a 
deficiency judgment to the plaintiff Hansens. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GREEN RIVER GROUP DID NOT ASSUME THE 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF HANSENS AND SYNVEST 
CORPORATION, AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE 
LIABLE FOR ANY DEFICIENCY AFTER 
FORECLOSURE BY THE HANSENS. 
The general rule where a party purchases real property 
subject to a mortgage under an existing executory contract is 
that such a purchaser does not assume the personal liability of 
the original purchaser for the payment of the first contract, 
unless he specifically agrees to do so, because the promise to 
pay for the land is not of itself a covenant running with the 
land. Lisenby v. Newton, 52 P. 813 (California 1898); Howell v. 
Kraft, 517 P.2d 203 (Washington 1974); Henock v. Yeamans, 340 
F.2d 503 (1965); see dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Tuckett in 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan v. King, 453 P. 2d 697 (Utah 
1969). And although the assumption of such an obligation may be 
implied from the circumstances, it is generally necessary to 
establish that the assignee assumed the obligation by clear and 
conclusive evidence. Perkins v. Brown, 38 P.2d 253 (Washington 
1934). 
Here, the transaction between Synvest and Green River 
Group was a separate contract. Had the defendant Green River 
Group intended to assume the obligations of defendant Synvest 
with respect to plaintiff Hansens, they most likely would have 
assumed the contract directly, using an assumption form. This 
theory of the facts is consistent, especially if one or two of 
the officers of Synvest were also partners in the Green River 
Group, because they would have been aware of all the implications 
of the contract with the plaintiff Hansens. However, all the 
facts point to an armfs length transaction; the purchase price 
paid by defendant Green River Group was Eighty Thousand 
($80,000.00) Dollars higher than that paid by defendant Synvest; 
the parties entered into a separate contract; defendant Synvest 
paid the Hansens directly. 
The plaintiffs1 reliance on Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan v. King, 453 P.2d 697 (Utah 1969) is misplaced under the 
facts of the instant case. In Prudential, the defendants King 
assigned their interest as purchasers of real estate under a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to defendants Evans. The Evans, in 
turn, assigned their interest in the same contract to Rice and 
Norton. The payments under the contract were not made, and 
plaintiff Prudential, who was itself an assignee from Maurer 
Development, brought suit to foreclose the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract as a mortgage, and sought deficiencies against 
defendants King, Evans, Rice and Norton. The trial Court denied 
the prayer for deficiency judgments against the assignees, and 
Prudential appealed. This Court reversed. 
There is an important, substantive difference in the 
Prudential case and the instant case. There was only one 
contract in that case, that being the original contract between 
Maurer Development and defendants King. All subsequent 
transactions were assignments on forms of assignment. At no time 
did any of the parties enter into a new contract to sell the 
property. Language in that contract, quoted by the Court, showed 
that the assignees had specifically accepted that original 
contract. Prudential, at 699. 
It is clear that in Prudential the parties intended to 
assign the original contract. However, in the instant case, 
there is no assignment, but an entirely new contract between 
defendant Synvest and defendant Green River Group, which was made 
subject to the mortgage contained in the original contract, and 
which was obviously not intended as an assignment of the contract 
between plaintiff Hansens and defendant Synvest. In fact, the 
language of that contract states ". . . that there are no 
representations, covenants or agreements between the parties 
hereto with reference to said property except as herein 
specifically set forth or attached hereto. Buyer agrees to be 
bound by the conditions that appear in all underlying contract." 
(Exhibit 3). The only "underlying contract" mentioned 
specifically in the agreement between defendant Synvest and 
defendant Green River Group was the contract with Joyce Nation. 
Radley v. Smith, 313 P.2d 465 (Utah 1957), is 
inapposite to the instant case because it does not deal with the 
transfer of real property subject to a mortgage, and it deals 
with the responsibilities of an assignee vendor, not a subsequent 
purchaser of property. The plaintiffs in Radley were purchasing 
apartment units of a building, and the defendant assignee vendor 
refused to pay the taxes on the building or supply necessary 
refrigeration and janitorial services. The plaintiffs in Radley 
were in a different position than the plaintiffs Hansen in the 
instant case. There, the plaintiffs had no recourse except a 
personal suit against the defendant to compel her to provide the 
necessary services to continue living at the apartments. Here, 
the plaintiffs Hansen have an adequate remedy in the foreclosure 
process and the right of deficiency against the party with whom 
they have contracted, defendant Synvest. 
Also, as Mrs. Justice Tuckett observed in his 
dissenting opinion in the Prudential case, Section 164 (1) of the 
Restatement of Contracts, which the Court relied upon in Radley, 
contains the caveat at the beginning of the section that ff. . . 
the statement of the benefits and burdens attached to successive 
owners of property because of a contract in a prior conveyance or 
lease is omitted . . . because the rules governing them are to 
some extent different.11 Prudentialf at 700. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HANSENS ARE AT BEST INCIDENTAL 
BENEFICIARIES OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
SYNVEST AND GREEN RIVER GROUP AND 
THEREFORE CANNOT RECOVER AGAINST GREEN 
RIVER GROUP ON A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT THEORY. 
The law is well settled in Utah that 
A third party who is not a promisee and 
who gave no consideration has an 
enforceable right by reason of a 
contract made by two others (1) if he is 
a creditor of the promisee or of some 
other person and the contract calls for 
a performance by the promisor in 
satisfaction of the obligation; or {2) 
if the promised performance will be of 
pecuniary benefit to him and the 
contract is so expressed as to give the 
promisor reason to know that such 
benefit is contemplated by the promisee 
as one of the motivating causes of his 
making the contract. (Emphasis added). 
Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 446 P. 2d at 415 (Utah 
1968). A third party who is within neither of these provisions 
has no right, even though the performance will incidentally 
benefit him. Schwinghammerf at 415. Further, fl[f]or a third 
party beneficiary to have a right to enforce a right, the 
intention of the contracting parties to confer a separate and 
distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear." Rio Algom 
Corporation v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d at 506 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, the trial Court did not find a separate, 
clear intention to benefit plaintiffs Hansen in the contract 
between defendants Synvest and Green River Group. There is ample 
evidence in the record to support this finding: 1) Synvest 
Corporation gained Eighty Thousand ($80,000.00) Dollars on the 
sale to Green River Group over that they paid to the Hansens for 
the property; 2) There is much evidence that the property was in 
a state of disrepair when Green River Group took possession of 
the property. Green River Group expended over Fifty-six Thousand 
($56,000.00) Dollars in attempting to bring the Green River Motel 
to a profitable posture. Synvest did not spend any money in 
repair of the motel. All of this activity by Green River Group 
benefitted Synvest primarily. The contract was not so expressed 
as to give Green River Group reason to know that Synvest intended 
to benefit the plaintiffs* That the plaintiff Hansens were bene-
fitted is incidental within the meaning of Utah law. 
As previously pointed out, the only "underlying 
obligation11 mentioned in the agreement between Synvest and Green 
River Group was the Joyce Nation agreement. If Synvest and Green 
River had intended that Green River assume the contractual 
obligation which Synvest had with plaintiffs Hansen, it would 
have to be mentioned, to make plaintiffs anything other than 
incidental beneficiaries. There was no evidence introduced at 
trial that points to such an intent. To say that it should be 
construed from the contract as it stands is pure speculation. 
All the evidence points to an arm's length agreement between 
Synvest and Green River Group. 
Finally, it is clear from the quit claim deed and the 
rescission of the contract between Synvest and Green River Group 
that the parties intended that Green River should be freed from 
any obligations under that contract, in consideration of what 
they had already paid, both on the contract and in the repair of 
the motel. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT GREEN RIVER 
GROUP IS THE ALTER EGO OF SYNVEST 
CORPORATION. 
This Court has held that 
[IJn order to disregard the corporate 
entity, there must be a concurrence of 
two circumstances; (1) there must be 
Q 
such unity of interest and ownership 
that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer 
exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact 
the alter ego of one or a few 
individuals; and (2) the observance of 
the corporate form would sanction a 
fraud, promote injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow. 
Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 678 P.2d at 794 
(Utah 1984). In the Messick case, this Court refused to pierce 
the corporate veil because 1) there was no evidence of the 
corporation's neglect of the "formalities requirement" associated 
with the first prong of the test, that is, it was not shown that 
the corporation did not observe the statutory requirements of a 
corporation. Messick, at page 794. Also, there was no evidence 
received that observance of the corporate entity would sanction 
fraud, promote injustice, or produce an inequitable result. 
Messick, at 794. 
The same result must be reached in the instant case 
because there is no evidence before the Court that Synvest did 
not observe the statutory requirements. There was no evidence 
presented at trial: 1) as to who were the stockholders of 
Synvest Corporation; 2) whether stock had been issued; 3) who the 
officers were, other than Boyd Hansen; 4) whether Synvest had 
filed Articles of Incorporation; 5) that Synvest was indeed 
undercapitalized as the plaintiffs claim. 
There was no evidence introduced at trial, and properly 
before the Court, that Ramon Pratt was involved with Synvest 
Corporation in any way. Exhibits C and D, appended to 
plaintifffs apellate brief, were not introduced into evidence at 
trial and should not be considered here as evidence. Exhibit D, 
a note purportedly signed by Ramon Pratt, has no foundation, 
other than plaintiff fs assertion that it was given as 
consideration for the contract between Synvest and plaintiffs 
Hansen. It may have been part of a different transaction. 
Plaintiffs assert that because the quit claim deed from 
Green River Group to Synvest recites consideration of only Ten 
($10.00) Dollars that collusion between the two entities must 
exist. It is a common practice to recite consideration of One 
($1.00) Dollar or Ten ($10.00) Dollars when conveying property, 
to keep the true amount of a transaction from public knowledge. 
There is no evidence before the Court as to what consideration 
actually passed from one entity to another. 
The second prong of the alter ego test laid out in 
Messick is if leaving the corporate entity intact would sanction 
fraud, promote injustice or produce an inequitable result. The 
record in this case is devoid of any evidence that such a result 
would follow if the Court here leaves the Synvest entity intact. 
The plaintiffs bought the motel property without ever inspecting 
it. They knew they were selling to a corporation and not to 
individuals. They made no effort to investigate the corporation 
or the proposed sale in any manner, not even to see if the motel 
could be profitable. Because the plaintiffs did not use good 
business judgment nor investigate an investment does not mean 
that they have been defrauded. A bad investment is not unjust, 
11 
but it would be unjust for the Court to make the partners of the 
Green River Group pay for the plaintiffs1 errors in judgment. 
Finally, there is no one to whom the Court could turn 
to order compensation if the corporate veil were pierced. There 
was no evidence presented at trial to show who owned Synvest 
Corporation or its stock. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
CONCLUDE THAT WASTE HAD BEEN COMMITTED 
BY THE GREEN RIVER GROUP WHILE THEY WERE 
IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY. 
Waste has been defined as ". . . the destruction, 
misuse, alteration, or neglect of premises by one lawfully in 
possession thereof, to the prejudice of the estate or interest 
therein of another.11 Jowdy v. Guerinf 457 P.2d at 748 (Arizona 
1969) . Waste may be voluntary, such as deliberate destruction of 
premises or buildings, or negligent, such as the failure of a 
tenant to exercise ordinary care of premises under his control. 
Jowdy, at 748. In Jowdy, the Arizona Supreme Court set forth 
three elements essential to a cause of action for waste: 
1. There must be an act constituting waste; 
2. The act must be done by one legally in possession; 
3. The act must be to the prejudice of the estate or 
interest therein of another. 
Jowdy, at 748. In the instant case, the plaintiffs 
presented the trial Court with a list of expenses which they 
incurred in repairs and maintenance of the motel property since 
they took possession in 1984. They insist that because the 
repairs were needed it must have been the acts of the defendant 
Green River Group which caused the disrepair. However, the 
testimony at trial conclusively showed that not one of the 
plaintiffs had seen the motel property before, or after, they 
purchased it in 1980. In fact the plaintiffs first saw the 
property in 1984. The plaintiffs did not produce one witness who 
saw the motel in 1980. The sole witness who had seen the motel 
in 1980, Brent Pratt, testified that the motel was in a state of 
disrepair when Green River Group took over the property. The 
trial Court correctly ruled that waste could not be assessed 
against Green River Group absent some proof that waste was 
committed by that defendant. 
Additionally, the testimony at trial indicated that the 
motel was approximately 25 years old. Waste does not include 
ordinary depreciation of property due to age and normal use over 
a short period of time, Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831 (Kansas 
1981) . There was no evidence introduced at trial to show the 
effects of depreciation, as opposed to waste. To simply show 
that what the plaintiffs paid out in expenses on the motel in 
1984, yet not show a causal connection between those expenses and 
some act, or omission, on the part of the Green River Group, or 
to fail to show that the same is not due to depreciation, is not 
adequate to support a cause of action for waste. The trial Court 
allowed a judgment for waste against Synvest corporation simply 
because they failed to appear for the trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
From an analysis of the facts presented at trial, and 
the applicable law, it is clear that the Green River Group and 
its individual partners cannot be held liable for a deficiency 
judgment in favor of the Hansens. The Green River Group did not 
assume Synvest Corporation's contract with the plaintiffs. The 
plaintiffs are not third party beneficiaries of that contract. 
There is insufficient evidence introduced at trial to show that 
Synvest was the alter ego of the Green River Group. There was 
insufficient evidence introduced to hold the Green River Group 
liable for any acts of waste. 
The trial Court ruled correctly on all aspects of this 
case and the judgment of that Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this of January, 1986. 
Gfagrge !|jl Harmond, Jr. / 
Jensen Law Offices 
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Respondents Arthur Melville 
and Marsha Utain 
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